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How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were to
increase their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development ac-
counting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on the
increase in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advan-
tage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number of
schooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.
We also quantify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary
data, compare our results with the standard development accounting
approach, and provide an update on the results using the standard ap-
proach for a large sample of countries.1 Introduction
Low GDP per worker goes together with low schooling. For example, in
the country with the lowest output per worker in 2005, half the adult
population has no schooling at all and only 5% has a college degree
(Barro and Lee, 2010). In the country with output per worker at the
10th percentile, 32% of the population has no schooling and less than 1%
a college degree. In the country at the 25th percentile, the population
shares without schooling and with a college degree are 22% and 1%
respectively. On the other hand, in the US, the share of the population
without schooling is less than 0.5% and 16% have a college degree.
How much of the output gap between developing and rich countries
can be accounted for by di⁄erences in the quantity of schooling? A ro-
bust result in the development accounting literature, ￿rst established
by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999), is
that only a relatively small fraction of the output gap between devel-
oping and rich countries can be attributed to di⁄erences in the quan-
tity of schooling. This result is obtained assuming that workers with
di⁄erent levels of schooling are perfect substitutes in production (e.g.
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hendricks, 2002). Perfect substitu-
tion among di⁄erent schooling levels is necessary to explain the absence
of large cross-country di⁄erences in the return to schooling if technology
di⁄erences are assumed to be Hick-neutral.
There is by now a consensus that di⁄erences in technology across
countries or over time are generally not Hicks-neutral and that perfect
substitutability among di⁄erent schooling levels is rejected by the em-
pirical evidence, see Katz and Murphy (1992), Angrist (1995), Goldin
and Katz (1998), Autor and Katz (1999), Krusell et al. (2000), Ci-
ccone and Peri (2005), and Caselli and Coleman (2006) for example.
Once the assumptions of perfect substitutability among schooling levels
and Hicks-neutral technology di⁄erences are discarded, can we still say
something about the output gap between developing and rich countries
attributable to schooling?
Taking a parametric production function approach to the develop-
ment accounting literature requires assuming that there are only two
imperfectly substitutable skill types, that the elasticity of substitution
between these skill types is the same in all countries, and that this elas-
ticity of substitution is equal to the elasticity of substitution in countries
where instrumental-variable estimates are available (e.g. Angrist, 1995;
Ciccone and Peri, 2005). These assumptions are quite strong. For exam-
ple, the evidence indicates that dividing the labor force in just two skill
groups misses out on important margins of substitution (Autor et al.,
2006; Goos and Manning, 2007). Once there are more than 3 skill types,
1estimation of elasticities of substitution becomes notoriously di¢ cult for
two main reasons. First, there are multiple, non-nested ways of capturing
patterns of substitutability/complementarity and this make it di¢ cult
to avoid misspeci￿cation (e.g. Du⁄y et al., 2004). Second, relative skill
supplies and relative wages are jointly determined in equilibrium and
estimation therefore requires instruments for relative supplies. It is al-
ready challenging to ￿nd convincing instruments for two skill types and
we are not aware of instrumental-variables estimates when there are 3
or more imperfectly substitutable skills groups.
We explore an alternative to the parametric production function ap-
proach and exploit that when aggregate production functions are weakly
concave in inputs, assuming perfect substitutability among di⁄erent
schooling levels yields an upper bound on the increase in output that
can be generated by more schooling. Hence, although the assumption of
perfect substitutability among di⁄erent schooling levels is rejected em-
pirically, the assumption remains useful in that it yields an upper bound
on the output increase through increased schooling no matter what the
true pattern of substitutability/complementarity among schooling levels
may be. This basic observation does not appear to have been made in the
development accounting literature. It is worthwhile noting that the pro-
duction functions used in the development accounting literature satisfy
the assumption of weak concavity in inputs. Hence, our approach yields
an upper bound on the increase one would obtain using the production
functions in the literature. Moreover, the assumption of weakly con-
cave aggregate production functions is fundamental for the development
accounting approach as it is clear that without it, inferring marginal
productivities from market prices cannot yield interesting insights into
the factors accounting for di⁄erences in economic development.
The intuition for why the assumption of perfect substitutability yields
an upper bound on the increase in output generated by more schooling is
easiest to explain in a model with two schooling levels, schooled and un-
schooled. In this case, an increase in the share of schooled workers has,
in general, two types of e⁄ects on output. The ￿rst e⁄ect is that more
schooling increases the share of more productive workers, which increases
output. The second e⁄ect is that more schooling raises the marginal
productivity of unschooled workers and lowers the marginal productiv-
ity of schooled workers. When assuming perfect substitutability between
schooling levels, one rules out the second e⁄ect. This implies an over-
statement of the output increase when the production function is weakly
concave, because the increase in the marginal productivity of unschooled
workers is more than o⁄set by the decrease in the marginal productivity
of schooled workers. The result that increases in marginal productiv-
2ities produced by more schooling are more than o⁄set by decreases in
marginal productivities continues to hold for an arbitrary number of
schooling types with any pattern of substitutability/complementarity as
long as the production function is weakly concave. Hence, assuming
perfect substitutability among di⁄erent schooling levels yields an upper
bound on the increase in output generated by more schooling.
From the basic observation that assuming perfect substitutability
among schooling levels yields an upper bound on output increases and
with a few ancillary assumptions ￿mainly that physical capital adjusts
to the change in schooling so as to keep the interest rate unchanged ￿
we derive a formula that computes the upper bound using exclusively
data on the structure of relative wages of workers with di⁄erent school-
ing levels. We apply our upper-bound calculations to two data sets. In
one data set of 9 countries we have detailed wage data for up to 10
schooling-attainment groups for various years between 1960 and 2005.
In another data set of about 90 countries we use evidence on Mincerian
returns to proxy for the structure of relative wages among the 7 at-
tainment groups. Our calculations yield output gains from reaching a
distribution of schooling attainment similar to the US that are sizeable
as a proportion of initial output. However these gains are much smaller
when measured as a proportion of the existing output gap with the US.
This result is in line with the conclusions from development accounting
(e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli,
2005). This is not surprising as these studies assume that workers with
di⁄erent schooling attainment are perfect substitutes and therefore end
up working with a formula that is very similar to our upper bound.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the
upper bound. Section 3 shows the results from our calculations. Section
4 concludes.
2 Derivation of the Upper Bound
Suppose that output Y is produced with physical capital K and workers
with di⁄erent levels of schooling attainment,
Y = F(K;L0;L1;:::Lm) (1)
where Li denotes workers with schooling attainment i = 0;::;m. The
(country-speci￿c) production function F is assumed to be increasing in
1Our calculations are closest in spirit to Hall and Jones (1999), who conceive the
development accounting question in terms of counterfactual output increases for a
given change in schooling attainment. Other studies use mostly variance decompo-
sitions. Such decompositions are di¢ cult once skill-biased technology and imperfect
substitutability among skills are allowed for.
3all arguments, subject to constant returns to scale, and weakly concave
in inputs. Moreover, F is taken to be twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
The question we want to answer is: how much would output per
worker in a country increase if workers were to have more schooling.
Speci￿cally, de￿ne si as the share of the labor force with schooling at-
tainment i, and s = [s0;s1::;si;:::sm] as the vector collecting all the shares.
We want to know the increase in output per worker if schooling were to
change from the current schooling distribution s1 to a schooling distrib-
ution s2 with more weight on higher schooling attainment. For example,
s1 could be the current distribution of schooling attainment in India and
s2 the distribution in the US. Our problem is that we do not know the
production function F.
To start deriving an upper bound for the increase in output per
worker that can be generated by additional schooling, denote physical
capital per worker by k and note that constant returns to scale and weak
concavity of the production function in (1) imply that changing inputs


















where Fk(k1;s1) is the marginal product of physical capital given inputs
(k1;s1) and Fi(k1;s1) is the marginal product of labor with schooling
attainment i given inputs (k1;s1): Hence, the linear expansion of the
production function is an upper bound for the increase in output per
worker generated by changing inputs from (k1;s1) to (k2;s2).
We will be interested in percentage changes in output per worker and


















Assume now that factor markets are approximately competitive. Then



























where ￿1 is the physical capital share in output and w1
i is the wage of
workers with schooling attainment i given inputs (k1;s1). Since schooling
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Hence, the increase in output per worker that can be generated by ad-
ditional schooling and physical capital is below a bound that depends
on the physical capital income share and the wage premia of di⁄erent
schooling groups relative to a schooling baseline.
2.1 Optimal Adjustment of Physical Capital
In (5), we consider an arbitrary change in the physical capital intensity.
As a result, the upper bound on the increase in output that can be gen-
erated by additional schooling may be o⁄because the change in physical
capital considered is suboptimal given schooling attainment. We now
derive an upper bound that allows physical capital to adjust optimally
(in a sense to be made clear shortly) to the increase in schooling. To
do so, we have to distinguish two scenarios. A ￿rst scenario where the
production function is weakly separable in physical capital and school-
ing, and a second scenario where schooling and physical capital are not
weakly separable.
2.1.1 Weak Separability between Physical Capital and School-
ing
Assume that the production function for output can be written as
Y = F(K;G(L0;L1;:::Lm)) (6)
with F and G characterized by constant returns to scale and weak con-
cavity. This formulation implies that the marginal rate of substitution
in production between workers with di⁄erent schooling is independent
of the physical capital intensity. While this separability assumption is
not innocuous, it is weaker than the assumption made in most of the
development accounting literature.2
We also assume that as the schooling distribution changes from the
original schooling distribution s1 to a schooling distribution s2; physi-
cal capital adjusts to leave the marginal product of capital unchanged,
2Which assumes that F in (6) is Cobb-Douglas, often based on Gollin￿ s (2002)
￿nding that the physical capital income share does not appear to vary systematically
with the level of economic development.
5MPK2 = MPK1: This could be because physical capital is mobile in-
ternationally or because of physical capital accumulation in a closed
economy.3 With these two assumptions we can develop an upper bound
for the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional
schooling, that depends on the wage premia of di⁄erent schooling groups
















The assumption that physical capital adjusts to leave the marginal prod-
uct unchanged implies that F1(k1=G(s1);1) = F1(k2=G(s2);1) and there-















Gi denotes the derivative with respect to schooling level i: Combined




































where the equality makes use of the fact that separability of the produc-












Hence, assuming weak separability between physical capital and school-
ing, the increase in output per worker that can be generated by addi-
tional schooling is below a bound that depends on the wage premia of
di⁄erent schooling groups relative to a schooling baseline.
3See Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for evidence that the marginal product of capital
is not systematically related to the level of economic development.
62.1.2 Non-Separability between Physical Capital and School-
ing
Since Griliches (1969) and Fallon and Layard (1975), it has been ar-
gued that physical capital displays stronger complementaries with high-
skilled than low-skilled workers (see also Krusell et al., 2000; Caselli and
Coleman 2002, 2006; and Du⁄y et al. 2004). In this case, schooling
may generate additional productivity gains through the complementar-
ity with physical capital. We therefore extend our analysis to allow
for capital-skill complementarities and derive the corresponding upper
bound for the increase in output per worker that can be generated by
additional schooling.
To allow for capital-skill complementarities, suppose that the pro-
duction function is
Y = F(Q[U(L0;::;L￿￿1);H(L￿;::;Lm)];G[K;H(L￿;::;Lm)]) (11)
where F;Q;U; and H are characterized by constant returns to scale and
weak concavity, and G by constant returns to scale and G12 < 0 to ensure
capital-skill complementarities. This production function encompasses
the functional forms by Fallon and Layard (1975), Krusell et al.(2000),
Caselli and Coleman (2002, 2006), and Goldin and Katz (1998) for exam-
ple (who assume that F;G are constant-elasticity-of-substitution func-
tions, that Q(U;H) = U, and that U;H are linear functions).4 The main
advantage of our approach is that we do not need to specify functional
forms and substitution parameters, which is notoriously di¢ cult (e.g.
Du⁄y et al., 2004).
To develop an upper bound for the increase in output per worker that
can be generated by increased schooling in the presence of capital-skill
complementarities, we need an additional assumption compared to the
scenario with weak separability between physical capital and schooling.
The assumption is that the change in the schooling distribution from s1











where s1 = [s0;:::;s￿￿1] collects the shares of workers with schooling lev-
els strictly below ￿ and s2 = [s￿;:::;sm] collects the shares of workers
with schooling levels equal or higher than ￿ (we continue to use the su-
perscript 1 to denote the original schooling shares and the superscript
4Du⁄y et al. (2004) argue that a special case of the formulation in (11) ￿ts the
empirical evidence better than alternative formulations for capital-skill complemen-
tarities used in the literature.
72 for the counterfactual schooling distribution). For example, this as-
sumption will be satis￿ed if the counterfactual schooling distribution
has lower shares of workers with schooling attainment i < ￿ and higher
shares of workers with schooling attainment i ￿ ￿. If U;H are linear
function as in Fallon and Layard (1975), Krusell et al.(2000), Caselli and
Coleman (2002, 2006), and Goldin and Katz (1998), the assumption in

































where we used that competitive factor markets and (11) imply w1
i=w1
0 =
F1Q1Ui=F1Q1U0 = Ui=U0 for i < ￿ and w1
i=w1
￿ = (F1Q2 + F2G2)Hi
=(F1Q2 + F2G2)H￿ = Hi=H￿ for i ￿ ￿.
































Hence, holding k=H constant, an increase in H=U either lowers the mar-
ginal product of capital or leaves it unchanged. As a result, k=H must
fall or remain constant to leave the marginal product of physical capital
unchanged, which implies (14).























8where we used w1
i=w1

























where we used w1
i=w1
￿ = (F1Q2Hi + F2G2Hi)=(F1Q2H￿ + F2G2H￿) =
























C C C C
A
+ (1 ￿ ￿
1)
0






















1 is the share of workers with schooling levels i < ￿ in aggregate
income. Hence, with capital-skill complementarities, the increase in out-
put per worker that can be generated by additional schooling is below a
bound that depends on the income share of workers with schooling levels
i < ￿ and the wage premia of di⁄erent schooling groups relative to two
schooling baselines (attainment 0 and attainment ￿).
To get some intuition on the di⁄erence between the upper bound in
(9) and in (18), note that the upper bound in (18) would be identical
to the upper bound in (9) if, instead of ￿
1, we were to use the share of
workers with schooling levels i < ￿ in aggregate wage income. Hence,
as the share of workers with low schooling in aggregate wage income
is greater than their share in aggregate income, (18) puts less weight
on workers with low schooling and more weight on workers with more
schooling than (9) (except if there is no physical capital). This is because
of the stronger complementarity of better-schooled workers with physical
capital.5
Because obtaining estimates of ￿
1 is beyond the scope of the present
paper in the rest of the paper we focus on the upper bound in (9) rather
than in (18).
5The main di¢ culty in estimating ￿
1 is de￿ning threshold schooling ￿: If ￿ was
college attainment, the upper bound could be quite large because developing countries
have very low college shares and the increase in college workers would be weighted
by the physical capital income share plus the college-worker income share (rather
than the much smaller college-worker income share only). If ￿ is secondary school,
the di⁄erence with our calculations would be small.
92.2 The Upper Bound with a Constant Marginal
Return to Schooling
The upper bound on the increase in output per worker that can be
generated by additional schooling in (9) becomes especially simple when
the wage structure entails a constant return to each additional year of
schooling, (wi ￿ wi￿1)=wi￿1 = ￿. This assumption is often made in
development accounting, because for many countries the only data on the
return to schooling available is the return to schooling estimated using
Mincerian wage regressions (which implicitly assume (wi￿wi￿1)=wi￿1 =
￿). In this case the upper bound for the case of weak separability between











((1 + ￿)xi ￿ 1)si
: (19)
where xi is years of schooling corresponding to schooling attainment i
(schooling attainment 0 is assumed to entail zero years of schooling).
The upper-bound calculation using (19) is closely related to analo-
gous calculations in the development accounting literature. In develop-
ment accounting, a country￿ s human capital is typically calculated as
(1 + ￿)
S (20)
where S is average years of schooling and the average marginal return
to schooling ￿ is calibrated o⁄ evidence on Mincerian coe¢ cients.6 For
example, several authors use ￿ = 0:10, where 0:10 is a ￿typical￿estimate
of the Mincerian return. One di⁄erence with our approach is therefore
that typical development accounting calculations identify a country￿ s
schooling capital with the schooling capital of the average worker, while
our upper-bound calculation uses the (more theoretically grounded) av-
erage of the schooling capital of all workers. The di⁄erence, as already
mentioned, is Jensen￿ s inequality.7 Another di⁄erence is that we use
country-speci￿c Mincerian returns instead of a common value (or func-
tion) for all countries.
6More accurately, human capital is usually calculated as exp(￿S), but the two
expressions are approximately equivalent and the one in the text is more in keeping
with our previous notation.
7To see the relation more explicitly, for small ￿, (1+￿)xi is approximately linear
and the right-hand side of (19) can be written in terms of average years of schooling
S =
Xm
i=1 xisi, as we do not miss much by assuming that
Xm
i=o(1+￿)xisi ￿ (1+￿)S
(ignoring Jensen￿ s inequality). As a result, if the Mincerian return to schooling is
small, the upper bound on the increase in output per worker that can be generated
102.3 Link to Development Accounting and Graphi-
cal Intuition
At this point it is worthwhile discussing the relationship between our
analysis of schooling￿ s potential contribution to output per worker dif-
ferences across countries and the analysis in development accounting.
Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1996), development account-
ing usually assesses the role of schooling for output per worker under
the assumption that workers with di⁄erent schooling are perfect sub-
stitutes in production. This assumption has been made because it is
necessary to explain the absence of large cross-country di⁄erences in the
return to schooling when technology is Hick-neutral (e.g. Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Hendricks, 2002). But there is now a consensus
that di⁄erences in technology across countries or over time are gener-
ally not Hicks-neutral and that perfect substitutability among di⁄erent
schooling levels is rejected by the empirical evidence, see Katz and Mur-
phy (1992), Angrist (1995), Goldin and Katz (1998), Autor and Katz
(1999), Krusell et al. (2000), Ciccone and Peri (2005), Caselli and Cole-
man (2006). Moreover, the elasticity of substitution between more and
less educated workers found in this literature is rather low (between 1.3
and 2, see Ciccone and Peri, 2005 for a summary).
Hence, the assumption of perfect substitutability among di⁄erent
schooling levels often made in development accounting should be dis-
carded. But this does not mean that the ￿ndings in the development
accounting literature have to be discarded also. To understand why
note that the right-hand side of (9) ￿our upper bound on the increase
in output per worker generated by more schooling ￿is exactly equal
to the output increase one would have obtained under the assump-
tion that di⁄erent schooling levels are perfect substitutes in production,
G(L0;L1;:::;Lm) = a0L0 + a1L1 + ::: + amLm: Hence, although rejected
empirically, the assumption of perfect substitutability among di⁄erent
schooling levels remains useful in that it yields an upper bound on the
output increase that can be generated by more schooling.
To develop an intuition for these results, consider the case of just two





￿ (1 + ￿)S
1
(1 + ￿)S1 :
Another approximation of the right-hand side of (19) for small ￿ that is useful





11labor types, skilled and unskilled, and no capital,
Y = G(LU;LH) (21)
where G is taken to be subject to constant returns to scale and weakly
concave. Suppose we observe the economy when the share of skilled
labor in total employment is s1 and want to assess the increase in output
per worker generated by increasing the skilled-worker share to s2: The

















[G2(1 ￿ s;s) ￿ G2(1 ￿ s;s)]ds: (22)
Weak concavity of G implies that G2(1 ￿ s;s) ￿ G1(1 ￿ s;s) is either
￿ at or downward sloping in s: Hence, (22) implies that y(s2) ￿ y(s1) ￿
[G2(1 ￿ s1;s1) ￿ G1(1 ￿ s1;s1)](s2 ￿ s1): Moreover, when factor mar-
kets are perfectly competitive, the di⁄erence between the observed skilled
and unskilled wage in the economy w1
H ￿w1
U is equal to G2(1￿s1;s1)￿
G1(1 ￿ s1;s1). As a result, y(s2) ￿ y(s1) ￿ (w1
H ￿ w1
U)(s2 ￿ s1). As
(w1
H ￿ w1
U)(s2 ￿ s1) is also the output increase one would have obtained
under the assumption that the two skill types are perfect substitutes,
it follows that our upper bound is equal to the increase in output as-
suming perfect substitutability between skill types. Figure 1 illustrates
this calculation graphically.8 The increase in output is the pink area.
The upper bound is the pink plus blue area. The ￿gure also illustrates
that the di⁄erence between our upper bound and the true output gain
is larger ￿making our upper bound less tight ￿the larger the increase
in schooling considered.9
It is worth noting that while weak concavity of the production func-
tion implies that the increase in output generated by more schooling
is always smaller than the output increase predicted assuming perfect
substitutability among schooling levels, it also implies that the decrease
in output generated by a fall in schooling is always greater than the de-
crease predicted under the assumption of perfect substitutability. Hence,
our approach is not useful for developing an upper bound on the decrease
in output that would be generated by a decrease in schooling.
8We thank David Weil for suggesting this ￿gure.
9Our implementation of the upper bound below considers US schooling levels as
the arrival value. As a result, the increase in schooling considered is large for many
developing countries and our upper bound could be substantial larger than the true
output gain.
123 Estimating the Upper Bounds
We now estimate the maximum increase in output that could be gener-
ated by increasing schooling to US levels. We ￿rst do this for a subsample
of countries and years for which we have data allowing us to perform the
calculation in equation (9). For these countries we can also compare the
results obtained using (9) with those using (19), which assume a con-
stant return to extra schooling. These comparisons put in perspective
the reliability of the estimates that are possible for larger samples, where
only Mincerian returns are available. We also report such calculations
for a large cross-section of countries in 1990.
3.1 Using Group-Speci￿c Wages
We implement the upper bound calculation in equation (9) for 9 coun-
tries for which we are able to estimate wages by education attainment
level using national censa data from the international IPUMS (Min-
nesota Population Center, 2011). The countries are Brazil, Colom-
bia, Jamaica, India, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico, South Africa, and
Venezuela, with data for multiple years between 1960 and 2007 for most
countries. The details vary somewhat from country to country as (i)
schooling attainment is reported in varying degrees of detail across coun-
tries; (ii) the concept of income varies across countries; and (iii) the con-
trol variables available also vary across countries. See Appendix Tables
1-3 for a summary of the micro data (e.g. income concepts; number of
attainment levels; control variables available; number of observations).
These data allow us to estimate attainment-speci￿c returns to schooling
and implement (9) using the observed country-year speci￿c distribution
of educational attainments and the US distribution of educational at-
tainment in the corresponding year as the arrival value.
It is worthwhile noting that in implementing (9) ￿and also (19) below
￿we estimate and apply returns to schooling that vary both across coun-
tries and over time. Given our setup, the most immediate interpretation
of the variation in returns to schooling would be that there is imperfect
substitutability between workers with di⁄erent schooling attainments
and that the supply of di⁄erent schooling attainments varies over time
and across countries. It is exacly the presence of imperfect substitutabil-
ity among di⁄erent schooling levels that motivates our upper-bound ap-
proach. Another reason why returns to schooling might vary could be
that there are di⁄erences in technology. Our upper-bound approach does
not require us to put structure on such (possibly attainment-speci￿c)
technology di⁄erences. Of course, our upper bound would be inaccurate
if technology changes in response to changes in schooling. To the extent
13that this is an objection, it applies to all the development-accounting
literature. For example, the Hall-Jones calculation would be inaccurate
if total factor productivity increases in response to an increase in hu-
man capital. However, our interpretation of the spirit of development
accounting is precisely to ask about the role of inputs holding technology
constant.10
The results of implementing the upper-bound calculation in (9) for
each country-year are presented (in bold face) in Table 1. For this group
of countries applying the upper-bound calculation leads to conclusions
that vary signi￿cantly both across countries and over time. The largest
computed upper-bound gain is for Brazil in 1970, which is of the order
of 150%. This result largely re￿ ects the huge gap in schooling between
the US and Brazil in that year (average years of schooling in Brazil was
less than 4 in 1970). The smallest upper bound is for Puerto Rico in
2005, which is essentially zero, re￿ ecting the fact that this country had
high education attainment by that year (average years of schooling is
almost 13). The average is 0.59.
A di⁄erent metric is the fraction of the overall output gap with the
US that reaching US attainment levels can cover. This calculation is also
reported in Table 1 (characters in normal type). As a proportion of the
output gap, the largest upper-bound gain is for Brazil in 1980 (57%),
while the smallest is again for Puerto Rico in 2005 (virtually zero). On
average, at the upper bound attaining the US education distribution
allows countries to cover 21% of their output gap with the US.
The shortcoming of the results in Table 1 is that they refer to a quite
likely unrepresentative sample. For this reason, we now ask whether us-
ing the approach in equation (19) leads to an acceptable approximation
of (9). As we show in the next section, data to implement (19) is read-
ily available for a much larger (and arguably representative) sample of
countries, so if (19) o⁄ers an acceptable approximation to (9) we can be
more con￿dent on results from larger samples.
To implement (19), we ￿rst use our micro data to estimate Mincerian
returns for each country-year. This is done with an OLS regression using
the same control variables employed to estimate the attainment-speci￿c
returns to schooling above.11 See Appendix Table 2 for point estimates
and standard errors of Mincerian returns for each country-year. Once
we have the Mincerian return we can apply equation (19) to assess the
10Another possible source of di⁄erences in schooling returns across countries is
sampling variation. However our estimates of both attainment speci￿c and Mincerian
returns are extremely precise, so we think this explanation is unlikely.
11The empirical labor literature ￿nds that OLS estimates of Mincerian returns to
schooling are often close to causal estimates, see Card (1999).
14upper-bound output gains of increasing the supply of schooling (assum-
ing that technology remains unchanged). The results are reported, as a
fraction of the results using (9), in the ￿rst row of Table 2 (bold type).
This exercise reveals di⁄erences between the calculations in (9) and (19).
On average, the calculation that imposes a constant proportional wage
gain yields only 77% of the calculation that uses attainment-speci￿c re-
turns to schooling. Therefore, the ￿rst message from this comparison is
that, on average, basing the calculation on Mincerian coe¢ cients leads
to a signi￿cant underestimate of the upper bound output increase asso-
ciated with attainment gains. However, there is enormous heterogeneity
in the gap between the two estimates, and in fact the results from (19)
are not uniformly below those from (9). Almost one third of the es-
timates based on (19) are larger. The signi￿cant average di⁄erence in
estimates and the great variation in this di⁄erence strongly suggest that
whenever possible it would be advisable to use detailed data on the wage
structure rather than a single Mincerian return coe¢ cient. It is inter-
esting to note that the ratio of (19) to (9) is virtually uncorrelated with
per-worker GDP. To put it di⁄erently, while estimates based on (19) are
clearly imprecise, the error relative to (9) is not systematically related
to per-worker output. Hence, one may conclude that ￿provided the
appropriate allowance is made for the average gap between (19) and (9)
￿some broad conclusions using (19) are still possible.
We can also compare the results of our approach in (9) to the calcula-
tion combining average years of schooling with a single Mincerian return
in (20). The results are reported in the second rows of Table 2. On
average, the results are extremely close to those using (19), suggesting
that ignoring Jensen￿ s inequality is not a major source of error in the
calculations. However, the variation around this average is substantial.
3.2 Using Mincerian Returns Only
The kind of detailed data on the distribution of wages that is required to
implement our "full" calculation in equation (9) is not often available.
However, there are estimates of the Mincerian return to schooling for
many countries and years. For such countries, it is possible to implement
the approximation in (19).
We begin by choosing 1990 as the reference year. For Mincerian
returns we use a collection of published estimates assembled by Caselli
(2010). This starts from previous collections, most recently by Bils and
Klenow (2003), and adds additional observations from other countries
and other periods. Only very few of the estimates apply exactly to the
year 1990, so for each country we pick the estimate prior and closest to
1990. In total, there are approximately 90 countries with an estimate of
15the Mincerian return prior to 1990. Country-speci￿c Mincerian returns
and their date are shown in Appendix Table 3. For schooling attainment,
we use the latest installment of the Barro and Lee data set (Barro and
Lee, 2010), which breaks the labor force down into 7 attainment groups,
no education, some primary school, primary school completed, some
secondary school, secondary school completed, some college, and college
completed. These are observed in 1990 for all countries. For the reference
country, we again take the US.12
Figure 2 shows the results of implementing (19) on our sample of
90 countries. For each country, we plot the upper bound on the right
side of (19) against real output per worker in PPP in 1995 (from the
Penn World Tables). Not surprisingly, poorer countries experience larger
upper-bound increases in output when bringing their educational attain-
ment in line with US levels. The detailed country-by-country numbers
are reported in Appendix Table 3.
Table 3 shows summary statistics from implementing (19) on our
sample of 90 countries. In general, compared to their starting point,
several countries have seemingly large upper bound increases in output
associated with attaining US schooling levels (and the physical capital
that goes with them). The largest upper bound is 3.66, meaning that
output almost quadruples. At the 90th percentile of output gain, output
roughly doubles, and at the 75th percentile there is still a sizable increase
by three quarters. The median increase is roughly by 45%. The average
country has an upper bound increase of 60%.
Figure 3 plots the estimated upper bounds obtained using (19) as a
percentage of the initial output gap with the US.13 Clearly the upper-
bound output gains for the poorest countries in the sample are small as
a fraction of the gap with the US. For the poorest country the upper-
bound output gain is less than 1% of the gap with the US. For the
country with the 10th percentile level of output per worker the upper-
bound gain covers about 5% of the output gap. At the 75th percentile
of the output per worker distribution it is about 7%, and at the median
it is around 20%. The average upper-bound closing of the gap is 74%,
but this is driven by some very large outliers.
In Table 4 we also report summary statistics on the di⁄erence be-
tween the upper bound measure obtained using (19) and the upper
bound obtained using (20). While the di⁄erence is typically not huge,
12To implement (19) we also need the average years of schooling of each of the
attainment groups. This is also avaiable in the Barro and Lee data set.
13For the purpose of this ￿gure the sample has been trimmed at an income level of
$60,000 because the four countries above this level had very large values that visually
dominated the picture.
16the measure based on (20) tends to be larger than our theory-based cal-
culation. Since the latter is an upper bound, we can conclude that the
calculation in (20) overstates the gains from achieving the attainment
levels of the US.
4 Conclusion
How much of the output gap with rich countries can developing countries
close by increasing their quantity of schooling? Our approach has been
to look at the best-case scenario: an upper bound for the increase in
output that can be achieved by more schooling. The advantage of our
approach is that the upper bound is valid for an arbitrary number of
schooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.
Application of our upper-bound calculations to two di⁄erent data sets
yields output gains from reaching a distribution of schooling attainment
similar to the US that are sizeable as a proportion of initial output.
However these gains are much smaller when measured as a proportion
of the existing output gap with the US. This result is in line with the
conclusions from the development accounting literature, which is not
surprising as many development accounting studies assume that workers
with di⁄erent schooling attainment are perfect substitutes and therefore
end up employing a formula that is very similar to our upper bound.
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0.908 0.945 0.769 0.792 0.769
0.053 0.056 0.047 0.054 0.06
1.238 0.916 0.439 0.543 0.543
0.524 0.411 0.169 0.187 0.201
0.434 0.408 0.331 0.255
0.088 0.109 0.072 0.055
0.202 0.108 0.045 -0.003 -0.012
0.209 0.111 0.061 ‐0.006 ‐0.019
0.745 0.708 0.609
0.140 0.129 0.130
0.757 0.604 0.403 0.860
0.568 0.353 0.132 0.235
Note:  upper bound changes in income from moving to US education distribution. 
Figures in bold type are percent income increases, based on equation (19) 
[i.e. Use attainment-specific returns to education]
Figures in normal type are percent income increases as share of overall income gap with US.
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India; 
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 










India1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.828 0.749 0.743 0.657





0.915 0.954 0.907 0.866 0.842
1.037 1.100 1.042 1.017 1.000
1.137 1.195 0.983 1.109 0.886
1.049 1.105 1.055 1.311 1.024
0.934 0.984 0.978 1.017
1.065 1.202 1.231 1.278
0.996 1.023 0.992 -1.748 0.134
1.237 1.285 1.369 -4.333 -0.479
0.711 0.612 0.694
0.861 0.739 0.855
0.693 0.917 1.112 0.283
0.612 0.958 1.172 0.283
Note:  alternative measures of upper bound changes in income from moving to US education distribution, 
as percent of baseline measure. 
Figures in bold type assume constant returns to each additional year of schooling [based on equation (19)]; 
Figures in nornal type assume constant returns and assign to all workers the average years of schooling
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India; 
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 










Indiamean max 90th percentile 75th percentile median
% Output gain using (19) 0.61 3.66 1.20 0.68 0.45




Income concept used in the analysis : total income per hour worked for 1980, 1991, 
2000; total income for 1970.
Other income concepts available:  earned income per hour worked for 1980, 1991, 
2000 (yield nearly identical results as income concept used for 1991 and 2000 but 
a significantly negative return to schooling in 1980).
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (state) of residence, dummy for urban area, dummy for foreign 
born, dummies for religion, dummies for race (except 1970).
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis: total income for 1973.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (municipality) of residence, dummy for urban area, dummy for 
foreign born.
Educational attainment levels: 9
Income concept used in the analysis: wage income for 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, 
2004.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of residence, 
dummy for urban area, dummies for religion.
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis: wage income for 1982, 1991, 2001.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (parish) of birth, 
dummies for region (parish) of residence, dummy for foreign born, dummies for 
religion, dummies for race.
Educational attainment levels: 7
Income concept used in the analysis: earned income per hour worked for 1990, 
1995, 2000; earned income for 1960; total income for 1970.
Other income concepts available: total income per hour for 1995, 2000.
Control variables used in the analysis: age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (state) of residence, dummy for urban area, dummy for foreign 
born, dummies for religion (except 1995).
Educational attainment levels: 10








Income concept used in the analysis: wage income per hour worked for 1990, 
2000; wage income for 1970; total income per hour worked for 1980.
Other income concepts available: earned income per hour worked for 1990, 2000; 
total income per hour worked for 1990 (yield nearly identical results as income 
concept used).
Control variables used in the analysis: age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth 
(except 1990), dummies for region (district) of residence, dummy for urban area 
(except 1990), dummy for foreign born (except 1980).
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis: wage income per hour worked for 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000, 2005.
Other income concepts available:  total income per hour worked for 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000, 2005; earned income per hour worked for 1990, 2000, 2005 (yield 
nearly identical results as income concept used.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (metropolitan area) 
of residence, dummy for foreign born, dummies for race (only 2000, 2005).
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis: total income per hour worked for 1996, 2007; 
total income for 2001.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (province) of birth 
(except 1996), dummies for region (municipality) of residence, dummy for foreign 
born, dummies for religion (except 2007), dummies for race.
Educational attainment levels: 6
Income concept used in the analysis: earned income per hour worked for 1971, 
1981, 2001; earned income for 1990.
Other income concepts available:  total income per hour worked 2001 (yields a 
Mincerian return to schooling of 13.7% as compared to 4.4% using earned 
income).
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (province) of residence, dummy for foreign born.
Educational attainment levels: 10








Panama1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
Brazil 0,124 (0,00005) 0,113 (0,00004) 0,115 (0,00004) 0,109 (0,00003)
Colombia 0,0889 (0,0005)
India 0,083 (0,00002) 0,0866 (0,00002) 0,074 (0,00002) 0,0776 (0,00001) 0,0788 (0,00001)
Jamaica 0,125 (0,002) 0,0573 (0,002) 0,0614 (0,001)
Mexico 0,123 (0,0002) 0,0993 (0,0001) 0,0682 (0,0001) 0,114 (0,0001) 0,094 (0,0001)
Panama 0,0879 (0,002) 0,0911 (0,0003) 0,0941 (0,0003) 0,0916 (0,0005)
Puerto Rico 0,099 (0,0003) 0,088 (0,0005) 0,0938 (0,0005) 0,0985 (0,0005) 0,116 (0,0004)
South Africa 0,117 (0,0001) 0,11 (0,0002) 0,143 (0,0002)
Venezuela 0,0625 (0,0005) 0,0875 (0,0003) 0,0732 (0,0002) 0,0443 (0,0005)
Note:  estimated Mincerian coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India;   
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 
2005 figure refers to 2004 for India and 2007 for South Africa
Appendix Table 21960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
Brazil 14660440 24720720 33616046 41010810
Colombia 3127210
India 86928152 45901965 109703806 133891583 139597372
Jamaica 255720 409100 443629
Mexico 4470106 6183300 14303270 18762057 21316086
Panama 246250 367330 408540 653460
Puerto Rico 653200 775220 698772 732668 1000738
South Africa 6775030 8299308 9360012
Venezuela 1540174 2567310 3548928 5038900
Note:  number of observations used in the individual-level Mincerian regressions
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India; 
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 
2005 figure refers to 2004 for India and 2007 for South Africa
Appendix Table 3Estimate Year
Kuwait 76562 ‐0.14 4.5 1983 0.275 0.317 ‐1.95
Norway 73274 ‐0.10 5.5 1995 0.132 0.141 ‐1.29
Zimbabwe 610 106.79 5.57 1994 0.337 0.370 0.00
Uganda 1525 42.13 5.1 1992 0.535 0.572 0.01
Vietnam 2532 24.99 4.8 1992 0.411 0.425 0.02
Ghana 2313 27.44 7.1 1995 0.477 0.578 0.02
Philippines 5897 10.16 12.6 1998 0.330 0.411 0.03
Nepal 2008 31.76 9.7 1999 1.197 1.518 0.04
Sri Lanka 6327 9.40 7 1981 0.355 0.408 0.04
China 3234 19.34 12.2 1993 0.769 0.964 0.04
Zambia 2595 24.35 11.5 1994 1.084 1.342 0.04
Cameroon 4490 13.65 6.45 1994 0.683 0.753 0.05
Peru 13101 4.02 5.7 1990 0.207 0.239 0.05
Estonia 15679 3.20 5.4 1994 0.169 0.181 0.05
Russian Federation 16108 3.08 7.2 1996 0.165 0.172 0.05
Kenya 2979 21.08 11.39 1995 1.135 1.353 0.05
Tanzania 1640 39.10 13.84 1991 2.225 2.676 0.06
Bulgaria 14140 3.65 5.25 1995 0.214 0.235 0.06
India 3736 16.61 10.6 1995 1.067 1.421 0.06
Bolivia 7624 7.63 10.7 1993 0.498 0.658 0.07
Indonesia 6413 9.26 7 1995 0.661 0.758 0.07
Sudan 3747 16.56 9.3 1989 1.248 1.417 0.08
Nicaragua 5433 11.11 12.1 1996 0.947 1.303 0.09
Honduras 7599 7.66 9.3 1991 0.674 0.763 0.09
Egypt 11387 4.78 5.2 1997 0.452 0.511 0.09
Dominican Republic 10739 5.13 9.4 1995 0.528 0.652 0.10
Slovak Republic 22834 1.88 6.4 1995 0.229 0.265 0.12
Poland 19960 2.30 7 1996 0.280 0.302 0.12
Croatia 20606 2.19 5 1996 0.274 0.299 0.13
Paraguay 10450 5.30 11.5 1990 0.719 0.851 0.14
Costa Rica 18352 2.58 8.5 1991 0.362 0.411 0.14
El Salvador 12182 4.40 7.6 1992 0.680 0.776 0.15
Czech Republic 31215 1.11 5.65 1995 0.186 0.210 0.17
Thailand 10414 5.32 11.5 1989 0.934 1.084 0.18
Ecuador 15528 3.24 11.8 1995 0.606 0.820 0.19
Sweden 47480 0.39 3.56 1991 0.076 0.080 0.20
Panama 17119 2.84 13.7 1990 0.568 0.770 0.20
Australia 54055 0.22 8 1989 0.046 0.038 0.21
Cyprus 37843 0.74 5.2 1994 0.162 0.178 0.22
Tunisia 13927 3.72 8 1980 0.829 1.006 0.22
Chile 23403 1.81 12.1 1989 0.442 0.546 0.24











closedArgentina 23222 1.83 10.3 1989 0.448 0.542 0.24
Korea, Rep. 33210 0.98 13.5 1986 0.262 0.406 0.27
Botswana 17280 2.81 12.6 1979 0.751 1.056 0.27
Cote d'Ivoire 4512 13.58 20.1 1986 3.660 7.593 0.27
Mexico 25835 1.55 7.6 1992 0.426 0.496 0.28
Morocco 7759 7.48 15.8 1970 2.109 3.550 0.28
Malaysia 23194 1.84 9.4 1979 0.524 0.657 0.29
South Africa 22638 1.91 11 1993 0.562 0.668 0.29
Colombia 18808 2.50 14.5 1989 0.787 1.044 0.32
Guatemala 10530 5.25 14.9 1989 1.674 2.193 0.32
Turkey 22996 1.86 9 1994 0.605 0.736 0.32
Hungary 27326 1.41 8.9 1995 0.501 0.588 0.36
Venezuela, RB 26164 1.51 9.4 1992 0.579 0.689 0.38
Jamaica 14588 3.51 28.8 1989 1.621 2.268 0.46
Canada 54026 0.22 8.9 1989 0.106 0.108 0.49
Brazil 16676 2.95 14.7 1989 1.451 1.903 0.49
Israel 53203 0.24 6.2 1995 0.126 0.149 0.53
Slovenia 32991 0.99 9.8 1995 0.553 0.693 0.56
Iran, Islamic Rep. 22339 1.95 11.6 1975 1.095 1.483 0.56
Greece 42141 0.56 7.6 1993 0.318 0.368 0.57
Portugal 35336 0.86 8.73 1994 0.569 0.658 0.66
Denmark 52032 0.26 5.14 1995 0.185 0.197 0.70
Finland 45289 0.45 8.2 1993 0.337 0.374 0.74
Ireland 52868 0.24 9.81 1994 0.234 0.266 0.96
Japan 51674 0.27 13.2 1988 0.264 0.333 0.97
Netherlands 59684 0.10 6.4 1994 0.117 0.127 1.14
Hong Kong 57093 0.15 6.1 1981 0.190 0.229 1.25
United Kingdom 51901 0.27 9.3 1995 0.342 0.405 1.28
Spain 50451 0.30 7.54 1994 0.449 0.541 1.48
Switzerland 57209 0.15 7.5 1991 0.255 0.314 1.70
Austria 56728 0.16 7.2 1993 0.300 0.331 1.88
France 58784 0.12 7 1995 0.300 0.347 2.52
Germany 56992 0.15 7.85 1995 0.392 0.480 2.54
Italy 63260 0.04 6.19 1995 0.305 0.344 7.63
Belgium 64751 0.02 6.3 1999 0.154 0.171 9.58
Singapore 63009 0.04 13.1 1998 0.634 0.724 14.36
United States 65788 0.00 10 1993 0.000 0.000 n.a.
Iraq n.a. n.a. 6.4 1979 0.567 0.664 n.a.
Taiwan n.a. n.a. 6 1972 0.330 0.293 n.a.
Note:  output per worker from PWT